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I. INTRODUCTION
We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years
ago. The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either
And let's not forget what happened . . . This was genocide in
the heart of Europe, not in 1945 but in 1995.
President William Jefferson Clinton'
A. Ethnic Cleansing at the End of the 2 0 1h Century
It is reprehensible and appalling to even imagine the horrors of eth-
nic cleansing that we are now witnessing in the Balkans at the end of the
20"h century - inhumane carnage that can be attributed not to the peoples
of the former Yugoslavia but to a few irresponsible leaders. Although an-
cestral hatreds and ethnic divisions of the peoples of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have existed for centuries, an Interna-
tional Commission on the Balkans established in 1994 by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace concluded that the 1992-1995 Balkan
civil war
was launched with deliberation and calculation by certain politi-
cal figures from the old Communist Yugoslavia - Slobodan
Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman chief among them - who believed
they could expand their power . . . by awakening and exploit-
ing the nationalism of Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, and
Moslems .... 2
1. Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES, Doc. 516, 517
(Mar. 29, 1999).
2. William Pfaff, The Balkans: A Political Mess with Political Solutions, BALTI-
MORE SUN, Oct. 7, 1996, at 9.
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One political figure, Jovan Raskovic, who had a prominent role in
launching the war announced on television on January 24, 1992 that
I feel responsible because I made the preparations for this war,
even if not the military preparations. If I hadn't created this emo-
tional strain in the Serbian people, nothing would have happened.
My party and I lit the fuse of Serbian nationalism not only in
Croatia but everywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's impossi-
ble to imagine an SDP (Serbian Democratic Party) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina or a Mr. [Radovan] Karadzic in power without our
influence.3
The Director of the Citizens Commission on Human Rights in France
later observed that Jovan Raskovic, with fellow psychiatrist Radovan
Karadzic, "had whipped the Serbs into a frenzy and set the stage for the
Balkans' biggest bloodbath since the area was occupied by the Nazis in
World War 11.1 ' 4
The determination that the cause of this 1992-1995 Balkan war was
so dependent upon the intentional actions of a few men strongly demands
their arrest and prosecution. Indeed, it has been reported that the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has accused
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in a sealed indictment of the exe-
cution of several thousand men in July 1995 during the civil war in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina.5 Yet, he remains free to kill again - and kill again
he has. Milosevic is now responsible for the savagery and ethnic cleans-
ing of Albanians in the Serb province of Kosovo. The international com-
munity cannot and must not stand idly by or continue to pursue military
options that are feared from the outset to be unworkable. It must stop the
slaughter in Kosovo, and it must punish those senior Yugoslavian offi-
cials who are responsible for the crimes that have marred the entire 201h
century with virtual impunity. It is very questionable whether an air war
will stop Milosevic or if it will simply punish the peoples of Serbia for
the crimes of their political leaders.
B. A Short History of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
Intense political strife, civil war, and conflict seem to have always
3. Patricia Forestier, Psychiatric Genocide! How the Barbarities of 'Ethnic Cleans-
ing' Were Spawned by Psychiatry, FREEDOM, May 1993, at 6, 6.
4. Id. at 6, 35.
5. See Report: Milosevic Wanted for Crimes, AsSOCIATED PRESS electronic news re-
lease, Apr. 4, 1999 (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//gotoap.cgi>.
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dominated the Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Montenegrin peoples. 6 Known
collectively as the South Slavs (or Yugoslavs), these peoples merged four
independent Balkan states on December 1, 1918 to form the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 7 The Kingdom, however, was politically
dominated by the Serbs who denied any autonomy to the Croats,
Slovenes, and other minority ethnic groups. 8 After a decade of internal
struggle, the king suspended the Constitution and assumed dictatorial
control of the government in an effort to avoid a civil war.9 The king
also changed the name of the state to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in
hopes of imposing a sense of national unity.'0
The oppression continued, however, and the king was assassinated
in 1934. 1 A more conciliatory federalist form of government was
adopted, but the oppression and civil strife still continued. 2 The King-
dom of Yugoslavia declared its neutrality when World War II first began,
but it succumbed in March 1941 to German pressure to join the Tripartite
Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan. 13 Popular dissatisfaction with this new
alliance within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia caused a successful coup
d'etat, and a new government was formed which was dedicated to neu-
trality."4 In response to this new declaration of neutrality, German, Italian,
Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces swiftly invaded and dismembered Yugo-
slavia in April 1941.1 Guerrilla warfare and political turmoil prevailed in
the Kingdom until World War II ended and a Croatian Communist guer-
rilla, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, formed a new government which was pro-
claimed in November 1945 as the Federal People's Republic of Yugosla-
via.' 6 This state was recognized by the United States, Britain, and the
Soviet Union,17 and it became a Member State of the United Nations on
October 24, 1945.18 Tito became President under a 1953 constitution, and
the country was renamed under a 1963 constitution as the Socialist Fed-
6. See Yugoslavia, MICROSoFr ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia,
1994).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See United Nations Member States, (last modified Dec. 9, 1998) <http:H
www.un.org/overview/unmember.html>.
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eral Republic of Yugoslavia. 19
When Tito died in May 1980, he left the country with a weak econ-
omy and government leadership that was saddled with a foreign debt in
excess of fifteen billion U.S. dollars. 20 Ethnic conflict and separatist
movements in the individual republics and provinces threatened the exis-
tence of the country.21 In January 1990, the League of Communists sur-
rendered its monopoly on political power, and the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia enjoyed its first free multiparty elections since
World War 11.22 In December 1990, a Communist leader and outspoken
nationalist named Slobodan Milosevic was elected President by the
Yugoslavs. 23
Milosevic believed that he could expand his power by exploiting the
nationalism of the Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, and Moslems. 24 One of
Milosevic's first official actions, for example, was to initiate a harsh pro-
gram of oppression in the Serb province of Kosovo. 25 As a direct result
of Milosevic's oppressive and racist policies,2 6 a series of violent and
bloody civil wars erupted and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via splintered into five states. The parliaments of Croatia and Slovenia
passed declarations of independence on June 25, 1991.27 Slovenia won its
independence after a ten-day war, and Croatia won its independence in a
cease-fire that ended a seven-month war during which it lost control of
more than one-third of its provincial territory.28 The Republic of Slovenia
and the Republic of Croatia became Member States of the United Na-
tions on May 22, 1992.29 The Yugoslav republic of Macedonia declared
its independence in September 1991,30 and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia became a Member State of the United Nations on April 8,
1993. 31
The declaration of independence by the provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in March 1992 caused a very bloody and protracted civil
19. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Pfaff, supra note 2, at 9.
25. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
26. See Pfaff, supra note 2, at 9.
27. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
28. See id.
29. See United Nations Member States, supra note 18.
30. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
31. See United Nations Member States, supra note 18.
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war.32 During this war, the Serbs were responsible for massive human
rights atrocities and ethnic cleansing that left over four million people
homeless or in poverty by the end of 1993. 3 Serb death platoons report-
edly marched to cadences that glorified the murder and rape of innocent
women and children. 34 Serb soldiers burned families alive in their homes,
crushed the heads of young children, and raped pregnant mothers in front
of their families. 35 As many as one hundred thousand women were taken
hostage and systematically raped in an effort to defile and impregnate
them so they would not be accepted back into their community.36 Non-
combatants were taken to concentration camps where they were savagely
interrogated and beaten to death.37 The most widely accepted estimate of
war deaths in the former Yugoslavia exceeds two hundred thousand civil-
ians and soldiers. 38 Early in the war, however, the international commu-
nity recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state,39 and it be-
came a Member State of the United Nations on May 22, 1992.40
Nevertheless, it took nearly four years and the loss of some three hun-
dred thousand lives before the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 4' [here-
inafter NATO] intervened with its military in 1995 to prevent the slaugh-
ter in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 42
Serbia and Montenegro, the remaining provinces, united and de-
clared themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 27,
1992. 43 With the exception of China, the international community did not
32. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
33. See id.
34. See Rod Nordland, 'Let's Kill the Muslims!', NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 48,
48.
35. See id. at 48-49.
36. See Forestier, supra note 3, at 6, 9.
37. See Robin Knight, et al., The Hunt for the Killers of Bosnia, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1995, at 52, 52.
38. See Peter Cary, War Casualties: Bosnia by the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 10, 1995, at 53, 53.
39. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
40. See United Nations Member States, supra note 18. To distinguish the provinces
of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the newly formed state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this
article will refer to the latter as Bosnia-Herzegovina.
41. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is "an inter-governmental organization
in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence." NATO Office
of Information and Press, NATO HANDBOOK 17 (1995). NATO also "provides the forum
in which they consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions
on political and military matters affecting their security." Id.
42. See John F. Harris, Despite 'Lessons,' Clinton Still Seen Lacking Strategy,
WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1999, at A15.
43. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
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recognize Serbia-Montenegro as the new Yugoslavia. n4  Serbia-
Montenegro has not been formally recognized as a state by the United
States; the U.S. view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
has dissolved and that none of the five successor republics represent its
continuation. 45
C. The Kosovo Crisis
The international community has supported and embraced the sepa-
ratist movements that led to the creation of four new Balkan states. The
Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have all declared and won
their independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The remaining territory of Serbia-Montenegro is now facing one final
separatist movement by the ethnic Albanians who reside in Kosovo and
are citizens of Serbia-Montenegro.
Kosovo is a province of Serbia.46 It currently has a population of ap-
proximately 1.8 million ethnic Albanians and two hundred thousand eth-
nic Serbs.47 Kosovo was given self-rule when Yugoslavia was established
in 1945,48 but tensions remained high because of continuing Serbian con-
trol.49 Rioting ensued and peaked in 1968,50 and then Kosovo attained au-
tonomy under the 1974 constitution. 51 The Serbian government continued,
however, to impose its authority over Kosovo and the ethnic Albanians
of Kosovo continued to riot.5 2 After a decade of strife, Serbia reasserted
its control over Kosovo, ending its autonomy in 1989.53 Immediately af-
ter he became President of Serbia, Milosevic placed Kosovo under mar-
tial law and severely restricted the province's privileges and rights. 54 The
Albanian separatists responded to the imposition of martial law with oc-
44. See id. To distinguish the provinces of Serbia and Montenegro from the newly
formed state of Serbia and Montenegro, this article will refer to the latter as either Ser-
bia-Montenegro or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
45. See Serbia and Montenegro, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Central Intelligence
Agency ed., 1998) [Internet version (visited Apr. 3, 1999) <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publi-
cations/factbook/sr.html>].
46. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at A13.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
50. See id.
51. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A 13.
52. See Yugoslavia, supra note 6.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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casional bombings.5 5 In 1991, the Albanian separatists proclaimed Ko-
sovo an independent republic, but it was only recognized as such by the
neighboring state of Albania. 56 In 1996, a few hundred Albanian separat-
ists formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 51
Starting in 1996, the KLA and militant Albanian separatists in-
creased their attacks on Serb policemen, leading to harsh reprisals by the
Yugoslav army.58 In two short years the KLA grew to an estimated ten
thousand soldiers.59 As it grew, the KLA increased the frequency of its
attacks on the Serbian police, causing a crackdown in February 1998
when Yugoslav army and special police units attacked dozens of vil-
lages. 60 During this crackdown, the Yugoslavs killed more than fifteen
hundred civilians and displaced more than 250,000 civilians. 61 On March
31, 1998, the United Nations Security Council [hereinafter Security
Council] adopted a Chapter VII resolution that condemned the "use of
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo
Liberation Army. ' 62 In September 1998, Serb forces attacked central Ko-
sovo and twenty-two Albanians were found massacred. 63 The Security
Council responded by adopting another Chapter VII resolution on Sep-
tember 23, 1998 that demanded "all parties, groups and individuals im-
mediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo." 64
In October 1998, NATO conducted airstrikes against Serb military
targets, and Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serb troops and allow two
thousand unarmed monitors to verify compliance. 65 On October 24, 1998,
the Security Council adopted a third Chapter VII resolution66 which en-
dorsed the cease-fire agreement and further condemned all acts of vio-
lence and terrorism. 67 The Serbs, however, failed to live up to the terms
55. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A13.
56. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, AsSOCIATED PRESS electronic news release,
Apr. 2, 1999 (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//gotoap.cgi>.
57. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A13.
58. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
59. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A13.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 531 Sess., 3868th mtg. at pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1 160 (1998).
63. Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
64. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53r Sess., 3930th mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1199 (1998).
65. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
66. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53r Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998).
67. Id., 1 1.
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of the cease-fire agreement.61 Scattered violence continued to endanger
the truce, and on January 15, 1999, forty-five ethnic Albanians were slain
by the Serbs. 69 International efforts attempted to bring the Albanian sepa-
ratists and the Serbs together in Rambouillet, France for peace talks in
February 1999 - but hostilities continued.70
On March 18, 1999 the Kosovar Albanians signed a peace agree-
ment calling for interim autonomy of Kosovo and twenty-eight thousand
NATO troops to implement the agreement, but Milosevic refused to
sign7' because he objected to the deployment of NATO forces in Serbia.72
The United States warned Milosevic on March 22, 1999 of NATO air-
strikes if he did not sign the Rambouillet Accords. 73 In defiance,
Milosevic launched a massive new offensive in central Kosovo 74 in an
apparent attempt to crush the Albanian guerrillas during peace negotia-
tions so he could then call off the Serb offensive to avoid NATO air-
strikes. 75 In the face of over 240,000 refugees fleeing from Kosovo, all of
NATO's nineteen member countries fully supported military action.76 On
March 23, 1999, NATO authorized airstrikes against Yugoslavia.77
NATO member countries do not recognize the province of Kosovo
as an independent state, and they specifically oppose the formation of an
independent Kosovar state; they only desire to see the bloodbath and hu-
manitarian disaster caused by the civil war to come to an end.78 Ironi-
cally, Milosevic's failure to compromise and accept some measure of po-
litical autonomy for the Serb province of Kosovo finally forced NATO to
take military action that may likely set the stage for an independent
Kosovar state. 79 Milosevic called the two rounds of talks at Rambouillet
a fraud, complaining that the agreement was dictated by NATO before
the start of the negotiations and without consulting Yugoslavia.80
68. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A13.
69. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Belgrade Rebuffs Final U.S. Warning: NATO Aerial As-
sault Could Begin This Week, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at Al.
73. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
74. See Background on The Kosovo Crisis, supra note 46, at A13.
75. See Smith, supra note 72, at Al.
76. See id.
77. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56.
78. See Barton Gellman, In the End, Allies See No Credible Alternative, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 1999, at A12.
79. See id.
80. See Katarina Kratovac, 'On the Brink:' NATO Poised to Attack Serb Forces,
FREE LANCE-STAR Fredericksburg, VA), Mar. 23, 1999, at Al.
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Milosevic also believes that Albanian separatism is nothing more than
centuries-old terrorism aimed at forming a "Great Albania" that is an
ethnically-cleansed state for all Albanians. 81 He alleges that the Albanian
peoples have murdered, persecuted, and ill-treated the Serbian and Mon-
tenegrin peoples since the Ottoman Empire. 82 In 1992, Milosevic docu-
ments that the Albanian separatists of Kosovo revived their use of terror-
ism, which increased in intensity from 12 dcts of terrorism against the
Serbs in 1992 to 1,885 acts of terrorism in 1998.83 Milosevic reports that
these 1,885 acts included the brutal murder of 115 Serb police officers
and 142 civilians. 84 Milosevic also alleges that NATO has previously sup-
ported acts of aggression against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia that caused it to splinter into five states, and charges that NATO is
now supporting Albania's aggression against Serbia-Montenegro by sup-
porting the Albanian separatists in Kosovo. 85 The Yugoslav government
has a number of other perspectives and equities that has not been fairly
reported in the press.86
Perhaps when the truth of both sides is revealed, the international
community will see that some of the Albanian separatists are not com-
pletely blameless for the plight of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. How-
ever, even the legitimacy of some of Milosevic's claims does not justify
his widespread and systematic slaughter of the ethnic Albanian popula-
tion in Kosovo. The U.S. Department of State reports that over three
hundred thousand people were displaced by the fighting during the sum-
mer of 1998.87 During Milosevic's defiant offensive in late March 1999,
the Serbs forcibly displaced over seventy thousand ethnic Albanians in
one weekend.88 The Serbs have also been reported to have looted and
burned thirteen towns and countless villages throughout Kosovo, detained
as many as thirty thousand Albanian men, and summarily executed
thousands of Albanian men, women, and children in at least twenty
towns and villages throughout Kosovo. 89 The United States position is
81. See The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Alba-
nian Separatists' Terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija, Feb. 1999 (visited Apr. 3, 1999)
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/yuembassy/terror.htm>.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See generally The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Website (visited Apr. 3, 1999)
<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/yuembassy/>.
87. See Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Ethnic Cleansing in
Kosovo, Mar. 31, 1999 (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/>.
88. See id.
89. See id.
[Vol. 23
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
that Milosevic's forces are clearly engaging in crimes against humanity in
Kosovo and are likely engaged in genocide, and it publicly warns the
Yugoslav commanding officers and political leaders that they will be held
responsible for their crimes and the crimes of their military forces. 90 One
of the Yugoslav warlords has already been indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war crimes committed
in Kosovo, and the senior Tribunal prosecutor is investigating other re-
ports of atrocities in Kosovo.91
NATO airstrikes in Serbia-Montenegro began on March 24, 1999.92
NATO forces targeted the Yugoslav "government's integrated air defense
system, military and security police command and control elements, and
military and security police facilities and infrastructure. ' 93 President Clin-
ton announced that the NATO airstrikes have three objectives:
First, to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to ag-
gression and its support for peace; second, to deter President
Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless
civilians by imposing a price for those attacks; and third, if nec-
essary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo
in the future by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.94
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Chronology of Kosovo Conflict, supra note 56. A detailed summary of the
NATO forces involved in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE and the enemy Yugoslav forces can
be found at the U.S. Department of Defense website at (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://
www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/>. THE ECONOMIST has reported that NATO's use of
military force in Serbia-Montenegro "seems to be a clear breach of NATO's own found-
ing document, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty." Specifically, it reports that "Articles 1
and 7 of the treaty explicitly bind NATO countries to act within the UN Charter, and Ar-
ticle 5 endorses the use of force only to repel an armed attack against a NATO member."
Law and Right, When They Don't Fit Together, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1999, at 19, 20.
To conclude, however, that NATO's actions violates the North Atlantic Treaty because it
requires NATO to act lawfully under the Charter presumes that its acts are unlawful
under the Charter. This is not very helpful in an analysis of the lawfulness of NATO's ac-
tions. Furthermore, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty does not limit NATO's use of
force to repel an armed attack. Article 5 simply is a recognition that an armed attack on
one or more NATO members is deemed an armed attack against them all. There is no
limitation in Article 5 on other uses of military force by NATO. The complete text of the
North Atlantic Treaty can be found at: NATO Office of Information and Press, supra note
41, at 231-34.
93. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 527 (Mar. 29, 1999).
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In response to the NATO airstrikes, Yugoslav security forces "have inten-
sified their attacks, burning down Kosovar Albanian villages and murder-
ing civilians. '95
Nevertheless, NATO airstrikes did not initially target the Yugoslav
ground forces responsible for the continuing attacks on civilians in Ko-
sovo out of a fear that pilot casualties would weaken NATO's will to
continue in the airstrikes against Yugoslavia, thus jeopardizing the entire
NATO operation. 96 At the end of the first two weeks of bombing, no
ground forces have been deployed.97 President Clinton vows that the air
campaign will be "unceasing and unrelenting" and that NATO will "per-
sist until we prevail."' 98 U.S. and NATO authorities, however, are at a
"loss for much evidence that the air strikes were having their intended
effect of slowing, let alone stopping, the Yugoslav crackdown." 99
On April 6, 1999, it was reported that over four hundred thousand
ethnic Albanians have fled Kosovo and at least two thousand have been
killed over the last thirteen months. 1°° United Nations officials estimate
that 1.1 million of the 1.8 million ethnic Albanians of prewar Kosovo are
now displaced to neighboring Balkan countries. 1 1 Milosevic has defied
the NATO offensive and has almost achieved the ethnic cleansing of Ko-
sovo. He has now offered a unilateral cease-fire, to mark Orthodox
Easter, which is to begin on April 6, 1999 at 2 p.m. (EDT).10 2 Milosevic
also pledged to work with the United Nations for the return of ethnic Al-
banian refugees and offered to forge an agreement that would serve as
the basis for a Kosovo province within Serbia and Yugoslavia. l0a NATO
quickly rejected the offer as a move clearly aimed at staving off further
94. President's Remarks Announcing Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets In the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 513,
514 (Mar. 29, 1999).
95. Thomas W. Lippman, New Serbian Backlash Feared, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
1999, at A32.
96. See Dana Priest, NATO Delays Action to Protect Kosovars, WASH. POST, Mar.
26, 1999, at Al.
97. See, e.g., Dan Balz, U.S. Consensus Grows to Send Ground Troops, WASH.
POST, Apr. 6, 1999, at Al.
98. Bradley Graham, Yugoslav Troops Elude Aerial Scan, Allies Report, WASH.
POST, Apr. 6, 1999, at Al.
99. Id.
100. See Dimitri Messinis, Allied Planes Target Yugoslav Sites, ASSOCIATED PRESS
electronic news release, Apr. 6, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//
gotoap.cgi>.
101. See id.
102. See George Jahn, Yugoslavia Declares Kosovo Truce, ASSOCIATED PRESS elec-
tronic news release, Apr. 6, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//gotoap.cgi>.
103. See id.
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NATO attacks and a ploy to present Milosevic as interested in resolving
the crisis without capitulating. 104 It was also unclear whether the unilat-
eral cease-fire was permanent, or just intended to last through the Easter
holiday.105
President Clinton dismissed the Serb's cease-fire offer by saying that
half-measures are not enough, that Milosevic must withdraw his military
police and paramilitary forces, allow the displaced Kosovar Albanians to
return to their homes, and accept the deployment of an international se-
curity force. 1°6 The U.S. Secretary of Defense called Milosevic's offer
"absurd," and other analysts saw Milosevic's announcement "as a sign
he has accomplished his main goal in Kosovo despite the NATO bomb-
ing campaign."' 0 7 The United States has announced that "NATO opera-
tions will continue until these conditions are met." 08 A subsequent press
release by the U.S. Department of State identified the following five
questions unanswered by Milosevic's proposal:
_ Is Milosevic prepared for verifiable cessation of all combat ac-
tivities and killings?
_ Is Milosevic prepared to withdraw military, police, and
paramilitary forces from Kosovo?
_ Is Milosevic prepared to agree to the deployment of an interna-
tional security force?
_ Is Milosevic prepared to permit the unconditional return of all
refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid?
_ And, finally, is Milosevic prepared to join in putting in place a
political framework for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet
accords? 109
The United States position is that Belgrade's proposal for a cease-fire
will be without significance unless it is accompanied by positive answers
to the above questions." 0
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Charles Babington & Dana Priest, Truce Rejected as Allies Press Bombing Ef-
fort, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1999, at Al.
108. Barry Schweid, US Won't Match Yugoslav Truce, ASSOCIATED PRESS electronic
news release, Apr. 6, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//gotoap.cgi>.
109. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Statement by James P.
Rubin, Spokesman: Belgrade's Cease-fire Insufficient, Apr. 6, 1999 (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1999/ps990406.html>.
110. See id.
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As a conciliatory gesture aimed primarily to sway international pub-
lic opinion,"' the Yugoslav government abruptly halted the expulsion of
the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo on April 7, 1999.112 The NATO Secre-
tary-General believes that a more likely motive is to exploit the refugees
by using them as "human shields" to discourage NATO attacks against
Yugoslav ground forces. 13 This policy pushed the refugees "back into a
wasteland where there is no food, very little water or medical supplies,
where everything has been looted."114 Interviews of refugees have con-
firmed that Yugoslav forces continue to commit atrocities with impunity
despite the NATO attacks.115 With no political or military solution in
sight, NATO reported on April 9, 1999 that it has stepped up its attacks
on Yugoslav ground forces. 116 NATO has reported that its airstrikes have
"almost completely cut off Kosovo from the rest of Serbia, the dominant
republic of Yugoslavia, by destroying all rail lines into the province from
the north and damaging most of the roads and bridges."" 7 NATO's
bombing of bridges in Belgrade has blocked the 1,750-mile long Danube,
stranding vessels and interrupting all of the shipping along the Danube
for nine European countries. 8 NATO's bombing has also unified the Yu-
goslav peoples' support for Milosevic and has completely alienated them
against NATO and the United States. 119 Milosevic announced on April 9,
1999 that the Yugoslav "14-month crackdown in Kosovo is over."' 20
D. Framing the Issues
A number of critics have challenged the legality of NATO's use of
military force against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia under interna-
111. See Michael Dobbs, Milosevic Shifts to Softer Strategy, WASH. POST, Apr. 8,
1999, at Al.
112. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Daniel Williams, Serbs Cease Expulsions From Ko-
sovo, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1999, at Al.
113. See William Drozdiak, NATO Chief Fears More Exploitation of Kosovo Al-
banians, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1999, at A32.
114. Smith & Williams, supra note 112, at Al.
115. See Daniel Williams, Refugees Tell of Use as Human Shields, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 1999, at Al.
116. See Thomas W. Lippman & Dana Priest, Attacks Largely Cut Kosovo From
Rest of Serbia, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1999, at Al.
117. Id.
118. See Anne Thompson, NATO-Bombed Bridges Clutter Danube, ASSOCIATED
PRESS electronic news release, Apr. 8, 1999 (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//
gotoap.cgi>.
119. See generally Michael Dobbs, Serb's Bull's-Eyes Defy, Mock NATO, WASH.
POST, Apr. 9, 1999, at A1.
120. Alex Efty, Yugoslavia Says Crackdown Over, ASSOCIATED PRESS electronic
news release, Apr. 9, 1999 (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://wire.ap.orgl/gotoap.cgi>.
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tional law. 121 Their principal arguments focus on the lack of Security
Council authority to use force and the absence of any threat to a nation
state that invokes NATO's ability to use armed force in collective self-
defense. This article will analyze the lawfulness of NATO's use of mili-
tary force against the Yugoslavs under international law. This analysis
will begin with a primer on contemporary use of force norms under the
Charter of the United Nations, and will include an evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of NATO's actions. It concludes with a few thoughts on how
to more effectively use military force to avoid humanitarian disasters
when diplomacy fails.
II. LAWFULNESS OF THE USE OF FORCE
[T]he people of Rwanda were forgotten ... This three-
month delay cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent
Rwandans . . . . I remain mystified that human life, the secur-
ity of noncombatants, and the prevention of such horrors as the
genocide in Rwanda are, sadly, not sufficient to act as a catalyst
for a swift and determined response from the international com-
munity. . . . It would be immoral if not outright criminal to al-
low another tragedy to occur by failing in our collective respon-
sibility to humanity at large. . . . The killings could have been
prevented [with 5,000 troops and a Chapter VII mandate] if there
had been the international will to accept the costs of doing
so. . . . We, as the international community, must be prepared to
come to the aid of humanity in a swift yet effective manner What
remains lacking, what is absent, is the will to implement such
solutions.
Lieutenant General Romeo A. Dallaire
Force Commander, UNAMIR 122
121. See, e.g., William Branigin & John M. Goshko, Legality of Airstrikes Disputed
in U.S., U.N., WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1999, at A10.
122. Romeo A. Dallaire, Foreword to SCOTT R. FEIL, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: How
THE EARLY USE OF FORCE MIGHT HAVE SUCCEEDED IN RWANDA, v-vi (A Report to the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Apr. 1998). Canadian General Ro-
meo A. Dallaire served as the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mis-
sion for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Id. at 1.
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A. A Primer on Contemporary Use of Force Norms Under Interna-
tional Law'12 3
Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations [here-
inafter Charter] codify contemporary international law that governs the
use of force between states. 124 The Charter clearly outlaws the aggres-
sive 125 use of force while recognizing a state's inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense in Article 51 and the Security Council's obli-
gation under Article 39 to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity. If a state uses force against another state within the meaning of
Article 2(4), it is unlawful unless it is an exercise of that state's inherent
right of self-defense or unless it is authorized by the Security Council
under its coercive Chapter VII authority.
Articles .2(4), 39, and 51 must be read together to determine the
scope and content of the Charter's prohibition on the aggressive use of
force, the responsibility of the Security Council to enforce this prohibi-
tion, and the right of all states to use force in self-defense. Article 2(4)
of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by any state against the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state except in in-
dividual or collective self-defense as authorized by international law and
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter.126 Articles 2(4) and 51 provide:
123. For more details on the international law of conflict management, see gener-
ally Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999).
124. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 11 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994).
125. Generally, "aggressive" refers to beginning a dispute by being the first to ei-
ther threaten or use force. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (5 th ed. 1979). However, an
aggressive use of force, i.e., aggression, is not defined by the Charter, and despite fifty-
four years of efforts, the international community has failed to formulate a generally ac-
ceptable definition of aggression. See generally, e.g., ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS AND A.J.
THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972). Accordingly,
an aggressive use of force can best be identified by studying state practice. For the pur-
poses of this article, an 'aggressive use of force' is a shorthand term used to refer to any
use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) that is not justified by a state's right of
self-defense or authorized by the Security Council under its coercive Chapter VII powers.
While this definition is somewhat circular in its reasoning, it is useful shorthand to facili-
tate a discussion of the basic principles of international law necessary for a more detailed
discussion of what constitutes a lawful and an unlawful use of force under international
law.
126. See NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW 87 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990).
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Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Pur-
poses stated in ArtIcle 1, shall act in accordance with the follow-
ing Principles: . ..
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Char-
ter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security. 27
Both Articles 2(4) and 51 are customary international law and therefore
binding on all states. 128
1. Self-defense and the Use of Force by States
It is a fundamental principle of contemporary international law that
states may only use force lawfully in individual or collective self-
defense. States recognize this principle, and have invoked their right of
self-defense as justification for almost every use of force since the Char-
ter has been in effect.129 It is generally accepted that the Article 51 right
of self-defense is coextensive with a state's right under customary inter-
national law. 130
127. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 51.
128. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 124,
at 126-27, 666-67.
129. See id. at 663.
130. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW
151 (1992). But see THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note
124, at 666, which concludes that Article 51 excludes any right of self-defense "other
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a. Necessity and Proportionality
Customary international law requires that all uses of force be neces-
sary and proportional, 131 and it prohibits the use of force for retaliatory or
punitive actions. 32 International law requires that a state's use of force be
necessary for either individual or collective self-defense. 33 For example,
the requirement of necessity for the international community to use force
in collective self-defense was clearly met when Iraq invaded and brutally
occupied Kuwait in 1990.134 If Iraq had simply entered Kuwait, destroyed
a number of its oil fields, and then quickly left, the principle of necessity
would very likely not have justified the use of force in the absence of a
continuing threat.
Similarly, international law requires that a state's use of force be
proportional in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary
to promptly secure the permissible objectives of self-defense. 35 The prin-
ciple of proportionality is frequently misunderstood as limiting the use of
force that can be used to destroy a military objective to the strength or
firepower of that objective-or in some other way limiting the use of
force between combatants. It does not, however, require any such parity
of force. Proportionality is a limitation on the use of force against a mili-
tary objective only to the extent that such a use of force may cause un-
necessary collateral destruction of civilian property or unnecessary human
suffering of civilians. The principle of proportionality is a balancing of
the need to attack a military objective with the collateral damage and
human suffering that will be caused to civilian property and civilians by
the attack. Proportionality categorically imposes no limitations on the use
of force between combatants in the absence of any potential effect on ci-
vilians or civilian property. 136
than that in response to an armed attack."
131. See MOORE, supra note 130, at 156.
132. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 124,
at 677.
133. See MooRE, supra note 130, at 156-57.
134. See id. at 157.
135. See id. at 158.
136. Indeed, one of the four strategic concepts of the national military strategy of
the United States is to use decisive force to overwhelm an adversary. See CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3 (1997). Even more notably, in December, 1990, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney threatened Saddam Hussein that the U.S. response to an Iraqi use of weap-
ons of mass destruction would be "absolutely overwhelming and .. . devastating."
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION
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b. Collateral Damage and Injury to Civilians
Proportionality limits the use of force that can be used to destroy a
military objective to that which does not cause unnecessary collateral de-
struction of civilian property or unnecessary human suffering of civilians,
but it does not prohibit any damage to civilian property or injury to civil-
ians. If civilian property and civilians support a war effort, they are sub-
ject to attack, and they are subject to incidental damage during an attack
on a lawful military objective. These two corollaries to the principles of
necessity and proportionality are very important to highlight in the con-
text of the impact of state activities on civilian property and civilians.
While civilian property and civilians may not be the object of an at-
tack as such, states may use force against civilian property and activities
that support or sustain an enemy state's warfighting capability during
armed conflict.137 States may use force during armed conflict, for exam-
ple, against economic targets such as enemy lines of communication, rail
yards, bridges, rolling stock, barges, industrial installations producing
warfighting products, and power generation plants. 138 In today's modem
society, much of a state's civilian infrastructure is used for military pur-
poses, and is thus subject to lawful attack during armed conflict if there
is a military advantage to be gained by such an attack. 139
Furthermore, it is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civil-
ians, or collateral damage to civilian property, during an attack on a le-
gitimate military objective. 140 The balancing of proportionality does re-
quire, however, that such incidental injury or collateral damage not be
excessive in light of the advantage anticipated by the attack.' 4' The law
of armed conflict requires a military commander to take all reasonable
precautions, based upon all the facts known or reasonably available at the
time, to keep civilian casualties and damage to the minimum consistent
with mission accomplishment and the security of his or her personnel. 142
c. Humanitarian Intervention
There is a continuing controversy concerning the permissibility of
AND PERSONNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991 (PUB. L. 102-25), app. Q, at 2 (Apr., 1992) [here-
inafter CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT.
137. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS T 8.1.2 (1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
138. See id. 8.1.1.
139. See CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT, supra note 136, app.
0, at 10, 11.
140. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 137, 8.1.2.1.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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unilateral armed force by states for humanitarian intervention. 143 THE
ECONOMIST has recently reported, for example, that most legal experts
"have reluctantly come to the conclusion that, at any rate in terms of in-
ternational law as it stands at the moment, the Americans and the British
are wrong [to claim the right of humanitarian intervention]."144 The opti-
mists among those legal experts note, however, that state practice will
make humanitarian intervention lawful one day, and that NATO's inter-
vention to protect the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo will be "a big step in
that direction."' 145 Accordingly, the controversy over the lawfulness of
humanitarian intervention is not whether it is malum in se, but whether
state practice which condones humanitarian intervention has yet devel-
oped into customary international law.
The consensus of most of the international scholars who are recog-
nized as experts in this field, however, specifically accepts that custom-
ary international law permits unilateral humanitarian intervention to pre-
vent widespread human rights violations under carefully limited
circumstances. Professor John Norton Moore, for example, defines a
comprehensive standard that
permits unilateral action only in response to threats of genocide
or other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in viola-
tion of international law, only if diplomatic and other peaceful
techniques are unavailable, and only if international agencies
. .. regional organizations, or the United Nations are unable to
take effective action.146
Similarly, Professor Richard Lillich concludes that humanitarian in-
tervention is consistent with post-Charter state practice and the two main
purposes of the Charter (the maintenance of peace and the protection of
human rights). 47 Professor Lillich concludes that humanitarian interven-
tion is justified even though it may interfere with the sovereignty of the
state where the intervention takes place. 48 He recommends that during in
extremis violations of human rights, states can unilaterally use propor-
tional armed force when the intervention has a limited purpose and dura-
tion. 49 He also notes that it certainly helps justify intervention if there is
143. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 126, at 142.
144. Law and Right, When They Don't Fit Together, supra note 92, at 19.
145. Id. at 20.
146. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 126, at 142.
147. See id. 147-48, 152.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 150.
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a request from at least some authority other than the recognized govern-
ment (such as a provincial government or regional organization) that ap-
pears to have a reasonable basis for making the request.1 50
Professor Christopher Greenwood concludes that there are "enough
precedents to justify the claim that armed humanitarian intervention is
now accepted by most states as legal."' 5' He refers to India's intervention
in Bangladesh in the 1970's to halt appalling atrocities; Tanzania's inter-
vention in Uganda to put an end to Idi Amin's barbaric rule; the 1990 in-
tervention by West African countries to stop mass killings in Liberia; the
1991 allied intervention in northern Iraq to save the Kurds; and the allied
imposition of a no-fly zone in southern Iraq to save the Shia Muslims as
precedents that were widely accepted by the international community as
lawful. 52 Professor Greenwood concludes that unilateral humanitarian in-
tervention is lawful under .customary international law if there is an im-
partial determination of three facts: that a catastrophe was occurring; that
it was a threat to international peace, and who was responsible. 53
In contrast to these scholars, others such as Professor Ian Brownlie
assert that it is extremely doubtful if the customary international law
right of unilateral humanitarian intervention survived the prohibitions of
the Charter, notwithstanding that the right has not been expressly con-
demned by the Charter.154 The better view, however, of the effect of the
Charter on the customary international law right of humanitarian inter-
vention is that the Charter was in fact the point of departure from the
pre-Charter regime that allowed states to summarily violate fundamental
human rights of its citizens. 55 This position is very eloquently described
by Professor Farer in the following excerpt:
&
Before the Second World War, scholars and diplomats assumed
that international law allowed each equal sovereign an equal right
to be monstrous to his subjects. Summary execution, torture, con-
viction without due process (or any process, for that matter) were
legally significant events only if the victim of such official ec-
centricities were the citizen of another state. . . . For the first
150. See id. Humanitarian intervention, by definition, is conducted without the con-
sent of the recognized government of the target state and without Chapter VII authority.
See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF
FORCE 113 (1993).
151. Law and Right, When They Don't Fit Together, supra note 92, at 20.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 338, 342 (1963).
155. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 126, at 674-75.
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time in history, states assumed obligations to their own citizens
as precisely and formally defined in many cases as the legal obli-
gations they had hitherto owed to each other under international
law. . . . Both through formal treaties and informal practice,
they bound themselves not to torture or summarily execute their
citizens, or to convict them without due process of law or to dis-
solve their trade unions or to discriminate among them on the ba-
sis of race or religion or to do a great number of other things
that in earlier ages were matters entirely at the discretion of sov-
ereigns. . . . The Charter of the United Nations was the point of
departure for this unique legal development. 56
Although not expressly permitted by the Charter or other international
convention, there is a very strong and convincing argument that contem-
porary state practice and customary international law permits a state to
unilaterally use armed force in collective self-defense to prevent genocide
and other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in violation of
international law.
2. Security Council Authority to Use Force
As an exercise of the international community's inherent right of
collective self-defense, Article 39 of the Charter imposes an obligation
on the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Ar-
ticle 39 provides that
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.15 7
Decisions taken by the Security Council under Article 39 are bind-
ing on all Member States.' Every threat or use of force proscribed by
Article 2(4) is, per se, a threat to international peace and security within
the meaning of Article 39.'1 9 Accordingly, the Security Council has the
coercive authority to authorize the use of force in response to any viola-
156. Id.
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
158. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMEN-
TARY, supra note 124, at 407-18.
159, See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 124,
at 119.
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tion of Article 2(4). 160
The authority of the Security Council to use force, however, extends
beyond violations of Article 2(4). Indeed, the Article 39 threshold ex-
tends considerably below the Article 2(4) threshold,1 6' giving the Security
Council the power to authorize states to use force under circumstances
where states do not independently have the right to use force in self-
defense. For example, scholars have concluded that threats to the peace
within the meaning of Article 39 include extreme intrastate violence or
human rights violations, the failure of a state to surrender terrorists in ac-
cordance with the order of the Security Council, an illegal racist regime,
cross-frontier expulsion of refugees, diversion of a river by an up-stream
state, and serious violations of international law that may provoke an
armed response.1 62
Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to shape an international
community response to a threat to international peace and security that
falls short of deploying military forces under Article 42. This article pro-
vides that
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Na-
tions to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations. 63
Article 41 is an explicit recognition that the Security Council has
the authority to require Member States to cease any or all forms of eco-
nomic relations, communications, or diplomatic relations with a state to
coerce that state to conform to internationally accepted standards of be-
havior. Its authority is directed toward Member States, not the state that
has created a threat to international peace and security.
Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to conduct or authorize
belligerent military operations against an aggressor state when such ac-
tions are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
This article provides that
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 113, 611-12.
163. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
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should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inade-
quate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations. 164
Although Article 41 explicitly authorizes the Security Council to re-
quire Member States to enforce economic and political sanctions against
an aggressor state, Article 42 only permits the Security Council to au-
thorize Member States to use armed military force against an aggressor
state.165
B. A Legal Analysis of NATO's Use of Military Force to Defend
Kosovo
1. International Legal Perspectives
President Clinton's public justifications focused on "moral impera-
tive[s]" and the political interests of America and NATO, 166 and his War
Powers Report did not refer to any international legal authority for the
airstrikes against Serbia-Montenegro. 167 The White House argues, how-
ever, that the NATO bombing campaign is backed internationally by Se-
curity Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 because they "affirm that the
deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to the peace
and security of the region."1 68 Specifically, the United States contends
that Resolution 1199 authorizes the use of armed force by United Na-
tions members to compel compliance with its terms because it is a Chap-
ter VII resolution, even though the resolution does not explicitly author-
ize the use of force. 169 The United States also contends that Resolution
1203 authorizes the use of armed force to protect personnel monitoring
the cease-fire, even though the monitors were withdrawn before the
164. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
165. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 124,
at 633.
166. See, e.g., Charles Babington, Clinton: Goal is to Contain Milosevic, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al.
167. See Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian
Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), supra note 93, at
527.
168. Branigin & Goshko, supra note 121, at A10.
169. See id.
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NATO airstrikes began. 70 Similarly, NATO has generally claimed to be
safeguarding international peace and security, as permitted under the
Charter of the United Nations.'
7 1
The United States and the other eighteen member states of NATO
have gotten "some scattered support" from the rest of the international
community, but most members of the United Nations view that any im-
plied authorization in Resolutions 1199 and 1203 to intervene was not
open-ended and that the NATO attacks are therefore not authorized by
the Security Council. 172 Russia and China have been the most vocal and
have denounced the NATO airstrikes as "blatantly illegal." 173 They ob-
ject to NATO's claim, noting that regional alliances cannot use military
force without specific authority from the Security Council. 174 China has
specifically called the airstrikes "a blatant aggression and act of vandal-
ism" and said "the international community has a moral imperative to
rise up against this barbarity."' 171 The Secretary-General of the United
Nations sidestepped the legal issue in his statement that it "is indeed
tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of
force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace."1
76
2. Self-defense
The United States and NATO do not iecognize the province of Ko-
sovo as an independent state, 177 and they have made no assertions that
the armed forces of the state of Serbia-Montenegro has attacked another
state. President Clinton has declared, however, that the Kosovo crisis is a
"conflict with no natural boundaries" that will "push refugees across
borders" and draw neighboring countries into the conflict. 178 Specifically,
he is concerned that such a flood of refugees "will likely reignite the
historical animosities [of neighboring states], including those that can
embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, [and] even Turkey." 179 Based upon
the fear of the Kosovo conflict spreading into NATO and other European
states, it is patently rational for NATO to use reasonable and proportional
170. See id.
171. See Barton Gellman, Two MiGs Reported Shot Down, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
1999, at Al.
172. See Branigin & Goshko, supra note 121, at A10.
173. Id.
174. See Gellman, supra note 171, at Al.
175. Branigin & Goshko, supra note 121, at A10.
176. Gellman, supra note 171, at Al.
177. See Gellman, supra note 78, at A12.
178. The President's News Conference, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 471 (Mar.
29, 1999).
179. Id.
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force in collective self-defense which is necessary to prevent the civil
war from spreading beyond Serbia-Montenegro into NATO states.
Although such a claim has not been asserted by NATO, 180 a fear that
ethnic conflict is a threat to neighboring states is very supportable, le-
gally and factually. It is generally accepted, as a matter of law and Se-
curity Council practice, that threats to international peace and security
within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter include extreme intra-
state violence or human rights violations and the cross-frontier expulsion
of refugees. 8' Indeed, the United Nations estimates that 1.1 million of
the 1.8 million ethnic Albanians of prewar Kosovo have been displaced
to neighboring Balkan countries since March 1998.182 Furthermore, Yugo-
slav forces are clearly engaging in ethnic cleansing and other crimes
against humanity, and are likely engaged in genocide.'83 One Yugoslav
warlord has already been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia for war crimes committed in Kosovo.'" Per-
haps more importantly from a legal perspective, Security Council Resolu-
tions 1199 and 1203 both specifically affirmed that the "deterioration of
the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a
threat to peace and security in the region." 85 As permanent members of
the Security Council, even Russia and China - the most vocal critics of
NATO's use of force - have agreed by voting for Resolutions 1199 and
1203 that the Kosovo crisis is a threat to regional peace and security, and
therefore a threat to member states of NATO.
NATO airstrikes have targeted civilian and military infrastructures
such as bridges, factories, government buildings, and military barracks. 8 6
Some of the most extensive airstrikes occurred on day thirteen of the
bombings when NATO warplanes attacked the Yugoslav air force head-
quarters, Yugoslav and Serb interior ministry buildings, Belgrade's inter-
national airport, a railway tunnel, bridges, fuel depots, ammunition stor-
180. See Law and Right, When They Don't Fit Together, supra note 92, at 20.
181. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 124,
at 113, 611-12.
182. See Messinis, supra note 100.
183. See Bureau of European Affairs, supra note 87. See also Alexander G. Hig-
gins, Signs of Genocide Seen in Kosovo, ASSOCIATED PRESS electronic news release, Apr.
8, 1999 (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://wire.ap.org//gotoap.cgi> ("U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan said he sees signs that Serbian authorities are committing genocide in
Kosovo").
184. See Bureau of European Affairs, supra note 87.
185. S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 64, at pmbl.; S.C. Res. 1203, supra note 66, at
pmbl.
186. See Graham, supra note 98, at Al.
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age areas, army barracks, and a television relay tower. s7 Two weeks of
bombings are beginning to take a toll on the Yugoslav economy and af-
fect the daily lives of the country's largest cities. 88
Undoubtedly, all of NATO's targets have been very carefully re-
viewed by military commanders and their legal advisers to ensure that
military attacks against them comply with the international law require-
ments of necessity and proportionality as well as the law of armed con-
flict. Even without access to sensitive targeting deliberations, the nature
of each of the reported targets either clearly identifies it as a lawful mili-
tary objective or indicates that it is likely being used to support
Milosevic's military offensive in Kosovo. Although there have been no
allegations that NATO has intentionally targeted civilian property or ci-
vilians in violation of the laws of armed conflict, NATO bombings have
caused collateral damage and incidental injuries. 189 In the worse single re-
port of civilian casualties since NATO airstrikes began, at "least three
NATO bombs missed their targets and struck this central Serbian town
[Aleksinac] Monday night [April 5, 1999], killing at least 11 civilians,
injuring more than 30 others and destroying homes, an ice cream factory
and an animal feed plant.'19 While these deaths are very unfortunate,
they are a consequence of NATO's lawful attacks on legitimate military
objectives.
NATO's use of armed force to defend Kosovo is also a lawful act of
humanitarian intervention that squarely meets the requirements of Profes-
sor Moore's criteria. First, NATO's use of armed force is in response to
threats of genocide and other widespread arbitrary deprivation of human
life of a magnitude that has not been seen in Europe since World War II.
Second, NATO exhausted months of diplomatic measures and Security
Council sanctions while the Yugoslavs continued the ethnic cleansing and
summary executions of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Third, NATO is
the cognizant defense alliance responsible for southern Europe and it has
only resorted to the regional use of armed force after the United Nations
proved it was unable to take effective action.
NATO's air campaign also squarely meets the requirements of Pro-
fessor Lillich's criteria. The sharply increasing tempo of the exodus of
1.1 million of the 1.8 million ethnic Albanians of prewar Kosovo is cer-
tainly an in extremis condition, and the terms of the Rambouillet Accords
187. See id.
188. See Guy Dinmore, Daily Life in Belgrade Teeters Under Strikes, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 1999, at A1.
189. See Guy Dinmore, 11 Civilians Are Killed in NATO Attack, WASH. POST, Apr.
7, 1999, at A16.
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define a very limited purpose and duration that respects the continuing
sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro. The intervention is also justified on
the grounds that the authorities who represent the ethnic Albanians of
Kosovo have signed the Rambouillet Accords and requested NATO's
help.
NATO's use of military force against Serbia-Montenegro also meets
Professor Greenwood's criteria. He specifically concludes that Security
Council resolutions have determined that a catastrophe is occurring in
Serbia-Montenegro, that it is a threat to international peace and security,
and that the Yugoslavs are responsible. 19' Furthermore, Professor Green-
wood notes that the votes of twelve members of the Security Council has
recently implied their view of the lawfulness of NATO's use of force
against Serbia-Montenegro. 192 On March 26, 1999, the Security Council
specifically defeated (by twelve votes to three) a resolution that con-
demned the NATO bombing in Serbia-Montenegro as unlawful. 193 Only
China, Russia, and Namibia voted in favor of the resolution. 194 The re-
maining twelve members of the Security Council which voted against the
resolution 95 are Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Slovenia, United Kingdom, Argentina, Bahrain, and United
States. 196
3. Security Council Authority
The United States and NATO contention that Security Council Reso-
lutions 1199 and 1203 implicitly authorize the use of armed force by
United Nations members to compel compliance with its terms simply be-
cause they are Chapter VII resolutions is unsupportable either in law or
Security Council practice. Chapter VII of the Charter sets forth certain
jurisdiction prerequisites that must be determined by the Security Council
before it can authorize the use of armed force. First, Article 39 requires
that the Security Council determine the "existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" before it can lawfully
invoke its Chapter VII coercive authority. This prerequisite has been met
by Resolutions 1199 and 1203. They are both Chapter VII resolutions
191. See Law and Right, When They Don't Fit Together, supra note 92, at 20.
192. See id.
193. See Security Council Rejecis Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, S.C. Press Release SC/6659, Mar 26, 1999 (visited Apr.
9, 1999) <http://www.un.org>.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See Membership and Presidency of the Security Council in 1999 (visited Apr.
9, 1999) <http://www.un.org>.
[Vol. 23
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
that have determined that a threat to international peace and security
exists.
Second, Article 42 requires that the Security Council consider
whether "measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate" before it can lawfully invoke its authority
to authorize the use of armed force. Resolutions 1199 and 1203 are the
Security Council's Chapter VII efforts to address the Kosovo crisis with
diplomatic means and Article 41 sanctions. A state that infers it has au-
thority to enforce a Chapter VII resolution merely because it is a Chapter
VII resolution usurps the Security Council's responsibility and authority
to maintain international peace and security.
The United States and NATO position creates a very dangerous pre-
cedent. Consider, for example, the provision of Chapter VII Resolution
1160 that:
Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace
and stability in Kosovo, prevent the sale or supply to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their nationals or
from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of
arms and related materiel of all types, such as weapons and am-
munition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the
aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terror-
ist activities there. 197
This resolution does not provide for any enforcement measures or block-
ades. It is simply an Article 41 measure that requires all states to prevent
certain specified sales to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Now as-
sume that the United States decides to slow the ethnic cleansing by sup-
plying prohibited arms and ammunition to the KLA in clear violation of
Resolution 1160. Should international law permit Russia, China, or any
other country, to infer that Resolution 1160 authorizes them to use armed
force against the United States? The United States would very likely be
the first to strenuously object to such an interpretation. While there must
be some flexibility in the interpretation of Security Council resolutions,
states must not be allowed to infer they have Chapter VII authority to
use armed force to enforce all Chapter VII resolutions. To do so gives all
states the carte blanche authority to use armed force to enforce all Chap-
ter VII resolutions simply because they are Chapter VII resolutions.
197. S.C. Res. 1160, supra note 62, T 8.
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III. CONCLUSION: NEW THINKING ABOUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to
act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors
. . . hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can
stop armies and save lives.
President William Jefferson Clinton 98
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HESITATES TO
ACT QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY AGAINST ETHNIC CLEANSING AND GENOCIDE?
Innocent people die. President Clinton's words in this epigraph ring very
true, but the air war has been described as a "limp military effort" that
"failed to deter the rape of Kosovo."' 199 Indeed, some believe that
NATO's efforts even appear to be speeding the Serb's murderous offen-
sive in Kosovo.200 One senior State Department official urged for a
tougher assault and does not believe that the first week of the NATO air
war accomplished anything. 201 Contingency planners and intelligence offi-
cials advised the political advisers that airstrikes would accelerate the
ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, but the conventional wisdom of the White
House and NATO decision makers predicted Milosevic would cave after
a few days of bombing. 202 It is reported that senior U.S. military officials
warned President Clinton and his top advisers that air power has its lim-
its and would not deter Milosevic. 20 3 Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff
warned President Clinton that his approach of a NATO air campaign
would likely not achieve its political aims.2°4 Despite ten days of NATO
airstrikes, Yugoslavia's army has stormed through Kosovo virtually un-
touched. 205 Even the Pentagon's spokesman admitted that it "is difficult
to say that we have prevented one act of brutality. ' ' 206
IS THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA-MONTENEGRO LAWFUL?
Unequivocally yes. However late and inadequate NATO's airstrikes and
subsequent use of military force may be in the prevention of the massa-
198. The President's News Conference, supra note 178, at 471.
199. Johanna McGeary, The Road to Hell . . . Was Paved with Good Intentions -
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[Vol. 23
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
cre of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, they are clearly lawful under in-
ternational law and consistent with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations. NATO's air campaign to prevent the eth-
nic cleansing and expulsion of an entire population has not been author-
ized by the Security Council, but it is a lawful act of collective self-
defense and a lawful humanitarian intervention. It is patently rational for
NATO to use reasonable and proportional force in collective self-defense
which is necessary to prevent the civil war from spreading beyond Ser-
bia-Montenegro into NATO states. Furthermore, contemporary state prac-
tice and customary international law permit a state to unilaterally use
armed force in collective self-defense to prevent genocide and other
widespread arbitrary deprivation of human life in violation of interna-
tional law.
HAS THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA-MONTENEGRO BEEN
TIMELY OR EFFECTIVE? Unequivocally no. NATO did not begin its air
campaign until after thousands died and hundreds of thousands were ex-
pelled from Kosovo. The first two weeks of the NATO air campaign
gave Milosevic the time to virtually complete the ethnic cleansing of the
Albanians in Kosovo. Milosevic's half-hearted, unilateral cease-fire decla-
ration in honor of Orthodox Easter was very likely just a political ruse to
gain time and undermine the political resolve of NATO. A continued air
campaign may eventually force Milosevic to capitulate; however, the
damage will have been done. Thousands of ethnic Albanians will have
already been tortured or murdered and hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Albanians will have already been forced out of Kosovo into neighboring
states. Many of the towns and villages will have been burned and de-
stroyed, leaving nothing for the refugees to return to should Milosevic
eventually capitulate.
IS THE UNITED STATES COMPLETELY TO BLAME FOR ANY SHORTCOM-
INGS OR FAILURES OF THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN? Absolutely not. Unfortu-
nately, this article may appear to criticize the United States for its Ko-
sovo policy - but the United States should be commended for taking the
initiative to shape an international strategy to prevent the ethnic cleansing
and humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo. Such a strategy is very difficult to
shape without the cooperation of other members of the international com-
munity. The leadership and initiative of Europe has been very obviously
missing. Once again, the European community seems to look to the
United States for the moral commitment and resolve to solve their ethnic
differences. The commitment of the international community has also
been lacking, especially from some of the members of the Security
Council, such as Russia and China, who also have the responsibility and
obligation under Article 39 of the Charter as a permanent member of the
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Security Council to take effective action to restore and maintain interna-
tional peace and security.
CAN NATO NOW DEAL WITH PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AS A
HEAD OF STATE? Absolutely not. Milosevic and many senior Yugoslav
government leaders and military commanders are accused of some of the
most heinous crimes against peace and humanity imaginable. Milosevic
and others have already been indicted by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia. They cannot be granted amnesty and
negotiated with; they must be prosecuted, and they must not be allowed
to profit from their crimes. The international community has boxed itself
into a very tough corner. It must now bow to Milosevic and let him win,
negotiate a peaceful settlement with him that includes his surrender and
the surrender of others accused of war crimes, or it must remove him
from power and then negotiate a peaceful settlement with his political
successors. These options certainly make early and decisive intervention
far more palatable and desirable.
WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DONE TO PRE-
VENT THE SLAUGHTER IN Kosovo 9 Milosevic should have been arrested
and prosecuted based on the ICTY's sealed indictment. Absent his arrest
and prosecution, an overwhelming ground force should have been
deployed in Kosovo early and decisively. Long before the crisis in Ko-
sovo erupted, Milosevic was indicted by the ICTY for the murder of
over two thousand men during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Kosovo crisis is a direct result of Milosevic's control over the Yugoslav
army and police forces. Had Milosevic been arrested and prosecuted, it is
very likely that the Kosovo crisis would never have occurred. However,
since the international community failed to arrest and prosecute
Milosevic, it should have responded to the ethnic cleansing of Albanians
in Kosovo much earlier and decisively. If the international community
had decisively deployed an overwhelming ground force when the first re-
ports of ethnic cleansing were verified, the status quo could have been
maintained until an arrangement could have been brokered between Ser-
bia-Montenegro and the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. A multinational
military force that was overwhelming in size and well-equipment could
have prevented further hostilities and ethnic cleansing by serving as an
inter-positional force. Instead, the international community waited until
thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands were expelled from
their own country before it began an air war that most senior advisors
and analysts predicted would fail.
SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NOW DEPLOY A GROUND
FORCE TO STOP THE ETHNIC CLEANSING IF MILOSEVIC DOES NOT CAPITU-
LATE? Absolutely not. While the White House refuses to publicly discuss
the deployment of NATO ground troops, several senior officials from
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previous administrations suggest that ground troops are the only success-
ful way to prevent the slaughter in Kosovo. 2 7 Senior NATO and U.S.
military commanders who doubt that the ongoing air war will stop the
Yugoslav offensive have begun discussing contingency plans for intro-
ducing allied ground troops.208 Recognizing the inability of the air war to
prevent the slaughter, the United States agreed on April 4, 1999 to send
24 Apache helicopter gunships to neighboring Albania, giving NATO the
ability to attack Serb troops and tanks from the air in the province of
Kosovo.2 °9 Now, however, a deployment of ground troops would very
likely be a bloody failure. 210 The Yugoslav army has nearly accomplished
the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, and would have a significant tactical ad-
vantage over NATO troops deploying into the Kosovar province.21' To in-
troduce a NATO ground force now without a peace agreement would be
disastrous.
SINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DID NOT TAKE MORE DECISIVE
ACTION EARLIER ON AND NOW THAT NATO HAS STARTED AN AIR CAM-
PAIGN, WHAT SHOULD NATO'S EXIT STRATEGY BE? NATO should intensify
its air campaign on the Yugoslav army and immediately stop the bombing
of the Yugoslav commercial infrastructures, remove Milosevic from
power, arrest and transfer all of the Yugoslavs accused of war crimes to
the ICTY, and broker a peace agreement between a new Yugoslav gov-
ernment and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. NATO should intensify its
air campaign on the Yugoslav army to either force its capitulation or de-
stroy it. These attacks should also specifically target Milosevic, senior
military commanders, and the Yugoslav command and control structure.
Focusing deterrence on regime elites such as Milosevic who is responsi-
ble for the atrocities in Kosovo is far more effective than traditional,
broad-spectrum economic or military sanctions against the entire people
of Serbia-Montenegro.2 12 NATO should, however, immediately stop its at-
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broadcast, Apr. 4, 1999) (relevant portions of transcript are available at (visited on Apr. 6,
1999) <http://secretary.state.gov/ www/statements/1999/990404.html>. NATO has con-
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tacks on the Yugoslav commercial infrastructures, notwithstanding that
they may be lawful targets to the extent they support the war effort.
NATO attacks on the commercial infrastructures of Yugoslavia have al-
ready been costly in human life, and they have been self-defeating and
counterproductive. These attacks have exacerbated the visceral hatred be-
tween the Yugoslavs and the ethnic Albanians and will make a peace ac-
cord very difficult to reach, implement, monitor, and enforce. The NATO
air campaign has also alienated the international community from the
peoples of Yugoslavia. NATO has reported that its airstrikes have almost
completely cut off Kosovo from the rest of Serbia. This kind of damage
to the transportation infrastructure will make resettlement of the refugees
very difficult and costly. It will also adversely affect the economic recon-
stitution of Kosovo in the years to come. The NATO bombings along the
Danube have also adversely affected the economies of many European
nations. Any further attacks on commercial infrastructures will seriously
compromise NATO's ability to restore peace in the Balkans. As discussed
above, NATO cannot deal with Milosevic as a head of state. He is an in-
dicted war criminal, and he must be removed from power. Milosevic and
other Yugoslavs who are accused of war crimes must be arrested and
transferred to the ICTY for prosecution. Finally, a peace agreement must
be brokered between a new Yugoslav government and the ethnic Albani-
ans in Kosovo.
WHAT LESSONS SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LEARN FROM
ITS MISSTEPS IN Kosovo? Indecision and timidity kills innocent people.
International law requires that we first consider diplomacy and other
peaceful mechanisms to resolve threats to international peace and secur-
ity, but international law does not require timidity in the face of slaugh-
ter, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The Member States of the United Na-
tions have imposed an obligation upon the Security Council to "make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to main-
tain or restore international peace and security." '213 All Member States
have also accepted the responsibility and obligation to "give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes ' 21 4 and to "accept and
cluded, however, that Milosevic's palace cannot be bombed because it is a prized histori-
cal treasure - and its destruction would alienate the peoples of Yugoslavia. George F.
Will, Stepping Into a Dark Room, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1999, at 84, 84. The palace is,
however, a lawful target. International law protects cultural buildings such as the palace
"provided they are not used for military purposes." COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 137, 8.5.1.6.
213. U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
214. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(5).
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carry out the decisions of the Security Council. ' 215 When diplomacy fails
and the international community must resort to military action, interven-
tion must be early and decisive. To juxtapose the three epigraphs to this
article, the international community is relearning the same lessons in Ko-
sovo as it did in Bosnia and as it did in Rwanda - when dealing with ag-
gressors, hesitation is a license to kill. Even when it had the legal and
moral authority to act, the international community hesitated in Rwanda
and again in Bosnia and again in Kosovo, and it failed to act early
enough to stop the killings and genocide that could have been prevented
if the international community had the will to act. NATO should have
learned from the shameful errors of the past and deployed its allied
forces early and decisively to stop the slaughter of the ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo and to have removed, justly and decisively, the threat to inter-
national peace and security in the person of Slobodan Milosevic.
215. U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
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